### A proof of the Nisan-Ronen Conjecture

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# Unrelated Scheduling

```
m tasks
Input:
```

```
n \text{ machines} \ \begin{bmatrix} t_{11} & t_{12} & \cdots & t_{1m} \\ t_{21} & t_{22} & \cdots & t_{2m} \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ t_{n1} & t_{n2} & \cdots & t_{nm} \end{bmatrix}
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Output:  $x_{ii} \in \{0,1\}$  an allocation of tasks to machines that minimizes the makespan

$$makespan = \max_{i} finish time_{i}$$

# Truthful scheduling mechanisms

weakly monotone scheduling algorithm + truthful payment

- We are interested only in weakly monotone (WMON) scheduling algorithms.
- for exactly these exist payments to the machines
   so that each machine i reports the running times t<sub>ij</sub> truthfully

<u>Definition:</u> The scheduling algorithm is *weakly monotone*, if for every machine i, for every fixed bids of the other machines, for any two bid vectors  $(t_{ij})_{j \in [m]}, (t'_{ij})_{j \in [m]}$  and the corresponding allocations  $x \neq x'$  holds that  $\sum_{j=1}^{m} (x'_{ij} - x_{ij}) \cdot (t'_{ij} - t_{ij}) \leq 0$ .

# The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism

 the simplest truthful mechanism gives each task independently to the fastest machine for that task

• VCG is *n*-approximative for makespan minimization

### The Nisan-Ronen conjecture

No truthful mechanism for unrelated scheduling can have a better than n approximation of the optimal makespan (indep. of computational power). [STOC'99, *Games and Economic behavior* 2001]

#### Lower bounds for truthful makespan approximation:

2		[Nisan, Ronen 1999]
$1+\sqrt{2}$	[Christ	codoulou, Koutsoupias, Vidali <i>Algorithmica</i> 2009]
1+arphipprox 2.618		[Koutsoupias, Vidali Algorithmica 2012]
n for anonymous mechan	isms	[Ashlagi, Dobzinski, Lavi Math.Op.Res. 2012]
2.755		[Giannakopoulos, Hammerl, Poças SAGT20]
3		[Dobzinski, Shaulker 2020]
$\sqrt{n-1}+1$		[Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, K. FOCS21]

<u>Our result:</u> No truthful mechanism for unrelated scheduling with n machines has better than n approx. factor for the makespan objective. [STOC23]

### Preliminaries I – graph and multigraph inputs


• we allow only 2 machines for each task:




- the tasks can be modelled as edges, and machines as vertices of a graph
- most of our tasks will have a 0 value on one of their machines (trivial tasks)

## Preliminaries II – weak monotonicity


the geometry of WMON allocations
 (for one machine and two tasks, fixed input of other machines)









• the boundary  $\psi_j$  is the highest  $t_j$  value (supremum) that still receives task j







### Proof sketch

Recall:  $\psi_i$  is the highest  $t_i$  value that player 0 still receives task j

0.	Γ 0	0		$\psi_{j}$		0	]	= t
1.	1					$\infty$		$s_1$
2.	$\infty$	1		$\infty$		$\infty$		<b>s</b> <sub>2</sub>
:	:		٠.			:		:
:	:			1		:		:
:	:				٠.	:		:
n.	$\infty$	$\infty$	$\infty$	$\infty$	$\infty$	1		sn

<u>Idea:</u> Prove the existence of such a (partial) input so that...

A. 
$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} \psi_j \geq n$$

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
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
B. and setting  $\psi_i$  for all j at once, player 0 still gets all tasks

Then: 
$$ALG = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \psi_j \ge n$$
,  $OPT = 1$ 


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- assume first  $\psi_j(s_j) = c \cdot s_j$



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



- consider boundary  $\psi_j$  as function of  $s_j$
- assume first  $\psi_j(s_j) = c \cdot s_j$
- then  $\psi_{i}^{-1}(t_{j}) = t_{j}/c$ , and ...
- $\psi_j(1) + \psi_j^{-1}(1) = c + \frac{1}{c} \geq 2.$



### Rough idea:

• use a task for each pair of n+1 machines






- modelling tasks as edges of a graph: start with a clique
- Sum up every  $\psi_{ij}(1)$

$$\sum_{i}\sum_{j\neq i}\psi_{ij}(1)=\sum_{i,j\mid i\neq j}(\psi_{ij}(1)+\psi_{ji}(1))\geq \binom{n+1}{2}\cdot 2=n\cdot (n+1)$$



### **Problem:** $\psi_{ii}$ is not linear



### **Idea:** integral

$$\int_0^1 (\psi_{ij} + \psi_{ji}) \, dz \, \geq \, 1 = \, \int_0^1 \, 2z \, dz$$

$$\Rightarrow \exists z \quad (\psi_{ij} + \psi_{ji})(z) \ge 2z$$
 (mean value theorem)

 $\Rightarrow \exists z \in (0,1]$  and  $\exists$  machine i such that


$$\sum_{j\,|\,j\neq i}\psi_{ij}(z)\geq n\cdot z$$

w.l.o.g. machine i = 0

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & \psi_{j}(z) & 0 & 0 \\ z & & & & \\ & z & & & \\ & & z & & \\ & & & z & \\ & & & z & \\ & & & z & \\ \end{bmatrix}$$

### **<u>Problem:</u>** As we change these tasks to $s_j = z$ , the boundary functions $\psi_{0j}$ change.


### Idea: multi-clique



- use exp. many parallel tasks (edges) allover in the clique;
- fix task values for each edge to independent random  $z \in (0,1]$  and randomly to  $0 \longleftrightarrow z$  or to  $z \longleftrightarrow 0$ ;
- round down each  $\psi^{\rm e}_{ij}$  to one of finitely many step-functions;
- many parallel edges e between i and j have the same  $\psi_{ij}^e$  by pigeonhole; let this be the single  $\psi_{ii}$ ;
- choose  $z \in (0,1]$  and machine i like above;
- many of the parallel edges will have value 0 for i, and the chosen z as fixed random value...
- ullet ... using that  $\psi^e_{ii}$  and the values of parallel tasks are independent


### We have shown existence of a machine and tasks with $\sum_i \psi_i(z) \ge n \cdot z$

We call such a task set a *nice star* 



Part B: But why can we set them to  $\psi_i$  at once?

#### Good and bad examples:



### Part B: change every 0 to $\psi_i$ at once!


<u>Theorem:</u> If we have exp. many parallel tasks (edges) for each machine j in a *multistar*, then it contains a star which is a box (unless  $approx = \infty$ ).

- for each satellite machine j we need many parallel tasks with the same  $\psi_j$  and allover the same z
- by the above Theorem there exists a star which is a box, and we obtain:

$$ALG \ge \sum_{j} \psi_{j}(z) \ge n \cdot z, \qquad OPT = z, \qquad approx \ge n$$


### Proof (intuition):

- induction on the number of satellites k = 2, ..., n;
- we use that all truthful mechanisms for 2 machines, 2 parallel tasks are known;
- induction step  $(k-1) \rightarrow k$ : assume  $\{1,2,\ldots,k\}$  is not a box (only its subsets)



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
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
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
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- ▶ in the 'blue' points, if  $\psi_k(s_k)$  were linear function, then it would have a non-box subset for some  $s_k$
- $\Rightarrow$  since  $\psi_k(s_k)$  nonlinear, the allocation of task k is independent of  $t_{k'}$  of every parallel task k'

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- $\Rightarrow$  since  $\psi_k(s_k)$  nonlinear, the allocation of task k is independent of  $t_{k'}$  of every parallel task k'
- $\Rightarrow \{1, 2, \dots, k'\}$  is a box
- $\Rightarrow$  the multistar contains plenty of k-stars that are boxes

Thank you!