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Marie Louisa Tølbøll Berthelsen and Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen. On the Computational Complexity of Decision Problems about
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Seunghee Han, Matvey Soloviev and Yuwen Wang. The Impact of
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Max Klimm, Daniel Schmand and Andreas Tönnis. The online best reply algorithm for resource
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Ioannis Caragiannis, George Christodoulou and Nicos Protopapas. Impartial selection with additive approximation guarantees
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Markos Epitropou and Rakesh Vohra. Dynamic Mechanisms with Verification
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Bruno Escoffier, Hugo Gilbert and Adèle Pass-Lanneau. The
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Zoi Terzopoulou and Ulle Endriss. Optimal
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Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Evi Micha and Alexandros Voudouris. The
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Vishnu Narayan, Enguerrand Prebet and Adrian Vetta. The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer
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Chi-Kit Lam and C. Gregory Plaxton. On the Existence of
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Vishnu Narayan, Gautam Rayaprolu and Adrian Vetta. Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions
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Chi-Kit Lam and C. Gregory Plaxton. Maximum Stable Matching
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Jackie Baek and Will Ma. Prophet Inequalities on the Intersection of a Matroid and a Graph
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Eleni C. Akrida, Argyrios Deligkas, Themistoklis Melissourgos and Paul Spirakis. Connected Subgraph Defense Games
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Sigal Oren and Dolav Soker. Principle-Agent Problems with Present-Biased Agents
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Reshef Meir. Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle
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Simina Branzei, Claudio Orlandi and Guang Yang. Sharing Information with Competitors
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Vijay Menon and Kate Larson. Mechanism Design for Locating a Facility
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Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre and Xiaomeng Zhang. Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location
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Diodato Ferraioli and Carmine Ventre. Obvious Strategyproofness,
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Soheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, Alireza Farhadi, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi and Nima Reyhani. Stochastic Matching on Uniformly Sparse Graphs
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Vittorio Bilò, Laurent Gourves and Jerome Monnot. On a
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Avrim Blum, Nika Haghtalab, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi and Saeed Seddighin. Computing Stackelberg Equilibria of Large General-Sum Games
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Daniel Halpern and Nisarg Shah. Fair Division With Subsidy
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