Accepted Papers

Joseph Halpern, Rafael Pass and Daniel Reichman. On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Resource-Bounded Players
Siqi Liu, J. Benjamin Miller and Alexandros Psomas. Risk Robust Mechanism Design for a Prospect Theoretic Buyer
Marie Louisa Tølbøll Berthelsen and Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen. On the Computational Complexity of Decision Problems about Multi-Player Nash Equlibria
Seunghee Han, Matvey Soloviev and Yuwen Wang. The Impact of Tribalism on Social Welfare
Max Klimm, Daniel Schmand and Andreas Tönnis. The online best reply algorithm for resource allocation problems
Ioannis Caragiannis, George Christodoulou and Nicos Protopapas. Impartial selection with additive approximation guarantees
Markos Epitropou and Rakesh Vohra. Dynamic Mechanisms with Verification
Bruno Escoffier, Hugo Gilbert and Adèle Pass-Lanneau. The Convergence of Iterative Delegations in Liquid Democracy in a Social Network
Zoi Terzopoulou and Ulle Endriss. Optimal Truth-tracking Rules for the Aggregation of Incomplete Judgments
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Evi Micha and Alexandros Voudouris. The Distortion of Distributed Voting
Vishnu Narayan, Enguerrand Prebet and Adrian Vetta. The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is)
Chi-Kit Lam and C. Gregory Plaxton. On the Existence of Three-Dimensional Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences
Vishnu Narayan, Gautam Rayaprolu and Adrian Vetta. Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions
Chi-Kit Lam and C. Gregory Plaxton. Maximum Stable Matching with One-Sided Ties of Bounded Length
Jackie Baek and Will Ma. Prophet Inequalities on the Intersection of a Matroid and a Graph
Eleni C. Akrida, Argyrios Deligkas, Themistoklis Melissourgos and Paul Spirakis. Connected Subgraph Defense Games
Sigal Oren and Dolav Soker. Principle-Agent Problems with Present-Biased Agents
Reshef Meir. Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle
Simina Branzei, Claudio Orlandi and Guang Yang. Sharing Information with Competitors
Vijay Menon and Kate Larson. Mechanism Design for Locating a Facility under Partial Information
Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre and Xiaomeng Zhang. Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location
Diodato Ferraioli and Carmine Ventre. Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation: The Case of Machine Scheduling
Soheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, Alireza Farhadi, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi and Nima Reyhani. Stochastic Matching on Uniformly Sparse Graphs
Vittorio Bilò, Laurent Gourves and Jerome Monnot. On a Simple Hedonic Gamewith Graph-Restricted Communication
Avrim Blum, Nika Haghtalab, Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi and Saeed Seddighin. Computing Stackelberg Equilibria of Large General-Sum Games
Daniel Halpern and Nisarg Shah. Fair Division With Subsidy